by Nikita Smagin *
Russia and Iran are finding more and more points of contact both in the foreign policy and economic spheres. It is no coincidence that this year has already become unprecedented in terms of the frequency of visits at high and highest levels between countries. The latest event in this context was the trip of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Tehran to participate in the summit of the leaders of Russia, Turkey and Iran on Syria.
The development of relations with the Islamic Republic, as well as the continued functioning of the Astana format, demonstrate the increasing use by Moscow of a pragmatic foreign policy model in which any non-Western country can be a partner, despite possible contradictions and inconsistencies in positions.
Against the backdrop of Biden
The Astana summit and V. Putin’s visit to Tehran took place immediately after the Middle East tour of US President Joe Biden. The attempts of many commentators to show the trip of the Russian leader to Iran as a kind of response to the initiative of the American leader are unlikely to have any real basis. However, J. Biden’s journey places the trilateral meeting in the Iranian capital in a broader context.
The Middle East can be called a specific region where the presence of both the United States and Russia is significant. At the same time, the dynamics of the involvement of the two countries is rather diametrically opposed to each other. If Washington is gradually withdrawing from the region, and the importance of the latter for the White House is declining, then Moscow, on the contrary, is increasingly drawn into the processes taking place in the Middle East.
The basic approaches also differ. The American side is accustomed to finding allies in the region who become the conductors of US policy, as well as to identify the main troublemakers, whom it seeks to contain and isolate. Russia, on the other hand, has neither friends nor enemies. For the past decade, Moscow has been trying to act as a universal mediator, maintaining relations with all the key forces in the Middle East.
Against the background of the events taking place around Ukraine, the United States seeks to turn Russia into an international pariah. The Middle East is considered one of Moscow’s potential ways to partially circumvent sanctions, so the logical task for Washington was to isolate the Russian side in the region. However, despite the existence of a solid list of US allied states and the not very enthusiastic reaction of the Middle Eastern countries to the special operation in Ukraine, this is not so easy to do. First of all, few people in the Middle East want to choose between Moscow and Washington. Russia not only remains an important player in the Middle East to be reckoned with, but also has a whole set of coinciding interests with almost all regional states, including American partners.
Thus, NATO member Turkey has serious disagreements with the Russian Federation over Syria, Libya and the South Caucasus. In addition, Ankara not only spoke out against Moscow’s actions in Ukraine, but also actively helps the Ukrainian side by supplying high-tech weapons. At the same time, Ankara, like Moscow, is frankly annoyed by the US-established order in the regions adjacent to Turkey, including the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Do not forget about the trade relations between Turkey and Russia: in 2021, the trade turnover amounted to about 33 billion dollars, and by the end of 2022 it can reach even more impressive figures. Obviously, in this situation, Ankara will continue the dialogue with Moscow both on Syria and on other issues.
A somewhat similar situation is observed in relation to the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf. None of these states has joined Western sanctions against Russia, and the UAE is becoming a kind of hub for Russian capital. Mohammed bin Salman, despite the visit of J. Biden to Saudi Arabia, made it clear that the agreements with OPEC +, where Russia is one of the main players, puts above the interests of the United States.
Outside the Persian Gulf, Egyptian President Abdul-Fattah Khalil El-Sisi also refuses to isolate Moscow. In recent years, Cairo has been one of the largest importers of Russian weapons. In addition, the Arab state, together with the UAE, is cooperating with Russia on Libya. Finally, we should not forget about another American partner – Israel. Despite some friction with Moscow, the Jewish state is still willing to cooperate with the Russian side to continue its policy of containing the Iranian threat in Syria. In other words, all the above-mentioned players have enough reasons to get away from the binary approach imposed on them by Washington: either you are with the United States or with Russia.
Model of Astana
Perhaps it would be a mistake to call J. Biden’s tour a failure. There have been isolated successes here, such as Saudi Arabia’s decision to open airspace to and from Israel. In addition, it is unlikely that the American side expected to reverse the alignment that has developed in the region, including the attitude towards Russia, with one trip. Rather, the general situation is indicative. Indeed, the events around Ukraine became a turning point in relations between Moscow and the West, however, the Middle East did not undergo any significant changes until February 24, 2022 and after.
The current situation in the region is very different from the Cold War-style polarization that analysts talk about so often today. The Middle East today is a complex combination of multi-vector political approaches of various countries. All this does not so much reflect the weakness of Washington, but rather the fact that Russia remains an important and legitimate player for Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates, and this alignment is unlikely to seriously change in the near future.
It was under these difficult political realities that the Astana format was created – a platform where parties sit at the same negotiating table as partners and resolve issues that not only differ in approaches, but even wage an indirect proxy war against each other. And if earlier this was true only for Syria, then the last summit brought the corresponding paradoxical relations to a new level. Turkish drones strike at the Russian army, which, in turn, actively shoots them down, but this does not prevent V. Putin and R.T. Erdogan to sit at the same table and communicate constructively at a meeting in Tehran. Moreover, one of the main topics on the sidelines of the summit was a story that is not related to the region at all – the solution to the issue of exporting grain through the Black Sea.
This is not at all about the banal hypocrisy of the parties with opposing interests. The Astana participants do not just smile at each other, holding a fig in their pocket – they really conduct a constructive dialogue. So, the issue of grain was finally resolved precisely thanks to the negotiations between Turkey and Russia, and here the summit in Tehran played an important role.
In fact, the Astana summit is becoming a role model that reflects the basic principles of Russia’s current foreign policy. We are talking about extreme forms of realism, when, in the presence of coinciding interests, cooperation is offered to everyone, regardless of the accompanying problems and disagreements.
In fact, the same format is offered to the West – despite the actual proxy war of Europe against Russia in Ukraine and the economic war, the weapons of which are sanctions, Moscow is ready to sell both gas and oil to European countries. “Gazprom has fulfilled, is fulfilling and will fulfill its obligations in full. Unless, of course, someone needs it, because they themselves close everything with their own hands,” V. Putin noted not without annoyance during a press conference following the summit in Tehran.
At the same time, the Astana format directly contradicts the traditional Western models of integration, when value proximity is needed to create an alliance. It is clear that Americans also do not always adhere to a value approach, but even in relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States, which are habitually outside of this, the issue of human rights (Joe Biden’s condemnation of the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi) suddenly became the main stumbling block. As a result, here and now, the Astana model of radical realism allows Russia in such a difficult situation to speak with everyone in the Middle East, while the United States is experiencing problems even with its traditional allies.
Iranian vector
Against the backdrop of the collapse of relations with the West in connection with the Ukrainian crisis, the Iranian foreign policy of Russia is increasingly separating itself into a direction on which certain hopes are pinned. As a result of V. Putin’s trip to Iran, no special breakthrough decisions were reported. Nevertheless, on the day of the summit, several news items appeared that created a positive background around the Iranian visit. So, on the day of the summit, the Tehran Currency Exchange launched trading in the Iranian rial/ruble pair. Another important story was the signing of a memorandum between the Iranian National Oil Company (NIOC) and Gazprom, which involves investments in the Iranian sector totaling about $40 billion.
Some important news came shortly after the visit of the Russian president. Among them are the decision to increase the number of flights between Russia and the Islamic Republic to 35 per week, the preparation of an agreement on the supply of Iranian aircraft parts and maintenance of aircraft, and the plans of the Russian side to allocate $1.5 billion for the development of railway projects in Iran.
It must be said that not all of these initiatives will necessarily be successfully implemented. First of all, in the case of most of the above, the time perspective is not defined, and not everyone will be able to reach the actual implementation. In other cases, as, for example, in the situation with the supply of aircraft parts, we can only talk about a limited set of products. Iran’s aviation industry has been going through difficult times for many years, being under sanctions. Of course, the Iranians have learned to do something themselves, but for the most part they import aircraft parts through third countries or use old planes chained to the ground for disassembly.
Nevertheless, some projects may turn out to be quite successful. Here there is an obvious build-up of areas for cooperation between the two countries, associated with the sharply increased interest of the Russian side in the Islamic Republic. In addition, some of the former areas of cooperation are receiving a completely new impetus. Thus, the export of Russian agricultural products against the backdrop of global food problems is becoming almost a key aspect of Iran’s food security. At the same time, the North-South transit corridor, which has existed only in test mode in recent years, threatens to become almost the main export route for products from Russia.
A certain rapprochement can also be seen at the foreign policy level. Among all the countries of the Middle East, Tehran made one of the most acceptable reactions for Moscow to the Ukrainian events. The spiritual leader of Iran, A. Khamenei, during negotiations with V. Putin in Tehran, stressed that the North Atlantic Alliance would start a war with Russia under the pretext of Crimea, if it had not been stopped in Ukraine. Some changes can also be seen in Syria, where Russia is increasingly responsive to Israel’s actions. Finally, the leitmotif of the trilateral summit in the Iranian capital was an attempt by Tehran and Moscow to jointly convince Ankara to abandon military operations on Syrian territory.
Be that as it may, the Russian-Iranian rapprochement does not threaten to develop into a full-fledged union. First of all, this is impossible because of the image of Russia in Iran, which is riddled with negative historical associations. Distrust of Tehran and misunderstanding of its policies can be found among the Russian elite as well. Finally, the parties are still quite far behind on a variety of issues, such as policy in the Middle East or the resolution of territorial disputes over the Caspian Sea.
It should also not be forgotten that Russia and Iran act as competitors in the energy market. The already mentioned agreement with Gazprom is largely due to the Russian side’s attempt to gain leverage over the Iranian oil and gas industry. So here we still need to see where the Iranians will eventually let Russian companies go.
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However, no matter how paradoxical it may sound, the existing bunch of contradictions does not interfere with the rapprochement between Iran and Russia. The model of realism applied by the Russian side makes it possible to focus on coinciding interests even in the face of much greater problems, as happens in the situation with Turkey. At the same time, both Tehran and Moscow are extremely interested in building an alternative economic order to the Western one. It is impossible to do this alone, and the two countries that have become handshakes for the West are suitable for this like no other.
An important reflection of what is happening was the work on the conclusion of a long-term strategic agreement between Iran and Russia – an analogue of the documents that Tehran already has with China and Venezuela. Judging by the statements of Russian officials, the project will be finalized soon. It is important that the document has the status of a memorandum – it formally confirms the intentions of the parties, but does not impose any direct obligations. The “Russian-Iranian axis” will continue to move in approximately the same direction. Relations can expand and deepen year by year, reaching more and more milestones, but the parties do not intend to take on any unnecessary obligations, including allied ones, to each other.
*Researcher, Iranian studies; Russian Council for International Affairs
