The recent remarks by Iran’s Supreme Leader, who described uranium enrichment as an “inviolable right,” have drawn a clear line. This position highlights the fundamental dilemma in the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the United States: either the U.S. acknowledges Iran’s sovereign right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes — which could introduce a new realism to diplomacy and make its success possible — or it rejects this right, thereby increasing the risk of negotiations collapsing amid perceptions of duplicity and perceived hypocrisy.
Iran’s logic is grounded in national sovereignty and strategic security. According to the Iranian leader, denying Iran the capability to enrich uranium while allowing other countries to do so is akin to prohibiting a nation from refining its own oil. This analogy is significant and compelling. If a country possesses raw resources but is prevented from processing them, it becomes perpetually dependent on foreign powers — a situation that threatens its energy infrastructure, economy, security, and sovereignty.
Historically, the United States and its allies have viewed enrichment capabilities with skepticism and suspicion, as this technology has dual-use applications; the same technology that can provide fuel for power plants can, with further enrichment, produce material necessary for nuclear weapons. However, this skepticism alone can no longer serve as a legitimate basis for denying enrichment rights, especially at a time when more countries — including U.S. allies like Saudi Arabia — are openly pursuing indigenous nuclear programs and demanding the right to enrich.
Moreover, the global context has shifted. As countries, including the United States, turn to nuclear energy as a clean and reliable resource in combating climate change, enriched uranium has transcended mere national interests to become a global issue. Companies involved in artificial intelligence, data centers, and advanced technology industries are increasingly in need of energy, and nuclear power is being progressively accepted as a long-term solution. This trend strengthens the argument that enrichment capabilities are not inherently destabilizing; rather, they are becoming essential for modern infrastructures.
This global transition towards nuclear energy is not merely speculative; it is actively occurring. The list of countries and companies investing heavily in nuclear infrastructure, including enrichment capabilities, is growing. The United States, under pressure from energy demands stemming from AI development and national security considerations, has launched a significant initiative to expand nuclear energy and aims to quadruple its capacity by 2050. Major tech companies like Meta and Microsoft are also becoming directly involved; Meta recently signed a 20-year contract with an American nuclear energy supplier to meet the energy needs of its AI projects, while Microsoft supports the development of small modular reactors for future data centers. The UK is advancing new projects like Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C, Poland is constructing its first commercial nuclear power plant in collaboration with Westinghouse, and countries such as South Africa, Kazakhstan, and even Saudi Arabia are implementing nuclear development programs. Many of these projects involve enriching uranium beyond the 3.5% threshold — the level used in initial reactors — approaching the levels that Iran requires, particularly for producing medical radioisotopes and research reactors, which generally need enrichment up to 20%. The widespread acknowledgment of these needs among U.S. allies and the private sector highlights a fundamental contradiction: rejecting Iran’s rights while others freely benefit from them becomes increasingly indefensible, especially when presented within the framework of peaceful and medical objectives.
Domestically, Iran’s right to nuclear technology seem to be the one issue most Iranians support. Iranian commentators, reflecting the wide support to nuclear rights among Iranians, have pointed out the incoherent position of the West pointing out that Trump has repeated his claims that Iran doesn’t need nuclear energy because it has oil. They respond saying that the United States, despite being one of the largest oil producers, is also one of the world’s biggest consumers of nuclear energy. France, for example, relies on 56 nuclear reactors to generate 68% of its electricity, and considers nuclear power a “national pride.” Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, India, and dozens of other countries — they all have entered the nuclear race with direct Western support. So why is Iran denied the same right, they ask.
The Iranian leader also referred to a previous experience that reinforces Iran’s distrust of Western commitments. The failure of the fuel swap proposal in the early 2000s, during which Iran agreed to exchange its low-enriched uranium for more enriched fuel but received nothing after the West withdrew, exemplifies why Iran insists on self-sufficiency. In this context, the insistence on enrichment is viewed not just as strategic but as essential and vital.
The United States now faces a pivotal choice. It can recognize Iran’s right to enrichment based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) — which explicitly does not prohibit enrichment but calls for oversight and inspections — and, instead of imposing bans, focus on transparency and verification. This path could affirm Iran’s legitimate energy needs, reduce tensions, and create an environment conducive to diplomatic flourishing. It could also set a precedent for a more equitable and rules-based global nuclear energy system.
Conversely, the U.S. could continue its staunch opposition to enrichment, viewing it as a proliferation risk. However, such an approach, while accepting or even supporting enrichment programs in other countries (like Saudi Arabia or Japan), undermines the moral legitimacy of Washington’s position and exposes it to accusations of geopolitical double standards. If enrichment in Iran is deemed a threat, it must be considered a threat elsewhere as well. Otherwise, the U.S. stance resembles a strategy of containment towards Iran rather than a principled adherence to non-proliferation.
Iran’s recent comments could indeed mark a turning point. If the United States recognizes the broader international trend where nuclear energy is no longer a luxury but a necessity, and chooses to engage with Iran based on transparency, negotiations could accelerate and yield results. However, if the U.S. continues to refuse to acknowledge Iran’s right to enrich while granting that right to others, the risk of diplomatic collapse and the entrenchment of a future based on mistrust increases. Ultimately, Iran’s insistence on enrichment compels the United States to make a fundamental choice: to embrace a realistic and coherent energy diplomacy or to cling to standards that no longer align with the nuclear realities of the world.
