In 2016, the Justice and Development Party (French acronym PJD) in Morocco won 125 seats of the 395-seat house of representatives in the parliament of Morocco, earning it the top spot and forcing the King to appoint the party’s leader to form a government. Fast forward to September 8, 2021, and the same party, under the same leadership managed only 1/10th of
the 2016 achievement shocking both, the party’s leaders and analysts. The leaders of the party claimed that the 2021 “results are unintelligible and irrational,” and then submitted their resignation. There are national circumstances and conditions that can explain this stunning defeat. But the implications cannot be limited to national borders and there were also regional that could be referenced to explain the outcome and predict future trends.
It is true, the government of Morocco, constitutionally, is limited to running domestic affairs, and even that, some of the domestic responsibilities are heavily checked by the Makhzen, which refers to the deep governing institution in Morocco, namely those associated with the Palace (King). Nonetheless, leaders of all parties know beforehand their responsibilities and powers and they should be able to assess the potential for success and failure in advance. While the PJD won enough seats to allow it to be selected to form a government in 2016, the party did not win enough seats to form a government on its own. They had to strike deals with other parties to form a governing majority and preserve such coalition throughout. Such deals led them to be more of a cover for policies and initiatives that may not have been their top priorities.
Regardless of the unique and specific circumstances of Moroccan politics, those who have been studying Islamist political parties in other countries, especially in Turkey, Tunisian, Jordan, Egypt, and performance of armed Islamist groups in Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan know that there are aspects of Muslims’ perception of and sentiment towards Islamist parties that are not bound by national border.
Importantly, what Islamist leaders and analysists should pay attention to in the next few weeks and months is how Ennahda of Tunisia will adapt and recalibrate to the challenges brought by the emergency presidential declaration and, importantly, how Taliban and other Salafi Islamists will compare their model of change to change through the ballet.
Variance in Islamists’ approaches and ideology is becoming more prevalent as more Islamist parties have moved from opposition to governance. In Morocco, the variance was present even before PJD contested national elections and won seats in the parliament. PJD hardly monopolized the representation of Islamism in the country. They competed for that with the more disciplined group called Justice and Charity (al-Adl wa-‘l-Ihsan, JC), founded by Sheik Abdessalam Yassine who was imprisoned by the father of the current king. With the flaws of the PJD, including inconsistency and limitless political pragmatism that diluted its brand and ideology, JC will gain from their loss and reshape the Islamist discourse in the country, in the region, and globally.
PJD, like Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym, AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)) and other derivatives of the Muslim Brotherhood believed in gaining and preserving political power through “pious prosperity.” After two decades in power, gains of the first decade under the AKP seem to have evaporated in the second decade of their rule in Turkey. Many Moroccans do not believe that they will need to wait another decade to prove that Islamist parties do not have a silver bullet to change the economic conditions of Muslim-majority countries. They are now treated like any other party and that will force many Islamists to rethink their platforms, strategies, and ideologies.