On September 23, 2021, the branch of the Islamic State (al-Khilafa) in Afghanistan released a statement claiming responsibility for an attack, using small arms, on members of the Taliban, whom they described as “Taliban militia.” Local news reports confirmed the attack. This is a small-scale attack that represented no serious danger to Taliban’s grip on power in Afghanistan. What it represents however, is how different is the world around Taliban compared to what it was in 1996-2001.
When Taliban took control of Afghanistan in 1996 only three other countries—Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia officially recognized the group’s government. This time around, Taliban delegates, before August 15 the day their forces entered Kabul, visited China, Iran, Russia, and some of the central Asian republics–but not Saudi Arabia. No country has recognized Taliban’s government yet, but it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will be the first to do so. It might as well be China, a superpower that shares borders with Afghanistan, and that went as far as calling on governments that are freezing Afghanistan’s money to release these assets to Taliban government.
In 2001, Taliban preferred to give up power instead of handing over Bin Laden to the US and closing al-Qaeda training camps. Considering that the “Islamic State” is a splinter group that broke away from al-Qaeda, one would think that Taliban would welcome the presence of IS (ISIL, ISIS) in Afghanistan. That is not what is happening: while visiting Iran, China, and Russia, Taliban representatives stressed that they will not allow “Daesh” (another acronym for IS) to gain a foothold in their country. This assurance does not seem to be political posturing because IS fighters are taking it seriously. With Taliban ending the armed resistance in Panjshir Valley, the only armed attacks that have been reported since, including the attack on Kabul airport that killed 28 Taliban soldiers, were carried out by members of the IS. What are the implications of these developments?
Simply put, Taliban may not have changed much in terms of ideology and approach. However, their base of support and inspiration has and that will force them to adapt and rethink their priorities and ideologies.
Ideologically, Taliban’s teachings and practices are derived from Salafism. Salafism is an ultraconservative creed derived from Hanbalism, one of the Sunni schools of thought to which Saudi Arabia subscribes. This brand of Salafism was promoted by Saudi Arabia as the form of Sunni orthodoxy. Rulers of Saudi Arabia presented themselves as the exemplars and promoters of this Sunnism. The rulers of the kingdom also adopted for themselves the title of the Custodians of the Two Holy Places. This custodianship extended to cover teachings and practices—not just mosques and shrines. The connection between Taliban and Saudi Arabia was strong and unbreakable—until now.
The shocking practices of ISIL in Syria and Iraq (like burning persons alive) over the past ten years, and the rise of Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) to power will force Taliban to take a second look at the ideological and political bonds connecting them to Salafism and to Saudi Arabia. It is clear that Salafism is no longer unified. The emergence of the IS severed the bond between Taliban and Salafism that was previously united behind al-Qaeda. Equally significant, the decisions and strategic plans adopted and promoted by the Saudi Crown Prince, MBS, unmasked the true nature of the regime in the Kingdom. Taliban leaders are unlikely to look at Saudi Arabia as a model for anything religious now that MBS has given up the title Custodian of the Two Holy Places in favor of the title Custodian of Aramco and Neom. These key developments and the warming relations with Russia, China, and Iran will necessarily present and represent Taliban, at least in the mind of other Salafists and in the mind of the Saudi rulers, as an aberration of and divergence from the Salafism of al-Qaeda and Saudi Arabia.
