Sanaa to Riyadh: Enough Hubris

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For seven full years, the Yemeni forces opposed to Saudi Arabia and their Yemeni allies did not stop resisting. In fact, they progressively and methodically built the means (military) and the narrative (ethical and political) for cause. During the first half of the Saudi war on Yemen, the Sanaa government was limited in its ability to counter the onslaught of the armies and mercenaries of two of the richest regional economies: Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.

This is not to say that the de facto government of Yemen did not take the battle to Saudi Arabia. Indeed, they did from year one. Yemeni fighters infiltrated the Saudi southern border and took control of large territories before retreating to defensive lines. They also launched attacks with missiles and primitive drones within 100 km adjacent territories. The Saudi regime dismissed these attacks as unserious annoyance and when the Yemeni armed forces sent their drones and missiles to eastern Saudi Arabia, the Saudi regime blamed Iran for the attack—still refusing to accept that the Yemenis could develop, on their own, weapons and drones that could pose a grave threat to the entire region. This willful denial on the part of the Saudi rulers could have been motivated by political calculus or by hubris. That is either changing now or must change.

In the last three years, Yemen government of Sanaa moved from the stage of defense to the stage of sustained offense. And, according to the current situation, it is making qualitative and exceptional leaps, putting the Saudi regime in front of challenges that it may not be able to bear.

The targets that were bombed inside Saudi Arabia last week show that the Yemeni leadership decided to reciprocate according to a new equation: attacks on Sanaa will be met with attacks Riyadh. For the first time, they decided to establish this new dynamic by deliberately targeting power stations and water desalination and refining plants in response to Saudi Arabia’s denial of fuel and food by its continued air, sea, and land blockade. Accordingly, if the siege on Yemen is not lifted by the summer 2022, the Saudi regime will be facing a very dangerous situation, the repercussions of which will affect all parts of the country.

This time, Riyadh could not conceal the sun with a sieve. The iconic image of black fumes covering the Saudi sky cannot be ignored by the media, even those used to Saudi censorship. So, the Saudi rulers this time decided to pivot: Use the attack to blackmail the world for assistance.

The most remarkable paradox in the most recent operation of “breaking the siege” carried out by the Yemeni army and the “People’s Committees” against vital targets inside Saudi Arabia is the extensive and direct media coverage on the air by satellite channels and various Saudi media.

In addition to wide media coverage, the Saudi government sent alerts indicating the effects of the Yemeni attacks on global oil supplies, and arguing that those who pressure Riyadh by asking it to pump more oil must take a decision to protect oil facilities, energy security, and sea lanes. As much as the Saudi messages represent a tool of pressure on the international community, especially Washington, they reveal, at the same time, the kingdom’s complete inability to protect itself and its vital sources.

The Saudi rulers seem to think that the amplified media coverage of the attacks could frighten the Yemeni people and leadership from changing public opinion and the international community, as well as finding justifications for their daily attacks on this country. In other words, Riyadh is now trying to hold Ansar Allah responsible for the rise in global oil prices. However, this approach could backfire and is likely to do so in the long run. Instead of building pressure against Sanaa government, this new strategy may put pressure on Saudi Arabia, forcing it to lift the siege on Yemen, especially since the attention of the superpowers now is completely consumed by the crisis in Ukraine. Consequently, while this policy is likely to produce counterproductive results, there is an opinion that says that the exposure of Saudi energy sources to further attacks may oblige Western decision-makers to search for stability in Bab al-Mandab, the Strait of Hormuz and the Mediterranean, where Iran and its allies have a significant presence.

Many observers see that the “National Day of Resilience” operation, which is being carried out by the missile forces and drones in the depths of Saudi Arabia, has become an annual tradition, announced on the eve of declaring the war on the Yemen, and is considered the inauguration of the new year. They point out that these operations are no longer characterized by secrecy. Rather, the Saudi rulers and their allies know that they will be attacked on the eve of the anniversary, as they were previously subjected to similar large-scale operations on the same anniversary, affecting sensitive military and economic facilities throughout the Kingdom.

So it is no surprise that, last week, on Friday March 25, 2022, Sanaa inaugurated the eighth year of the aggression and siege with a large-scale military operation that targeted a large number of vital Saudi installations. This operation comes days after the implementation of the second “Breaking the Siege” operation, and it is an extension of the third “Breaking the Siege” operation that targeted an Aramco facility in Jeddah and Jizan. It also coincided with official preparations made by the Ansar Allah movement to commemorate the seventh “national day of defense in the face of aggression and siege,” which coincides with the anniversary of the coalition’s declaration of war on Yemen on March 26, 2015. It is an annual occasion that the movement has celebrated since the second year of the aggression. These military activities were immediately coupled with a political initiative that is quite significant: The Sanaa government announced a unilateral ceasefire for three days. It offered it as an opportunity for the Saudi rulers to choose peace by stopping their attacks and lifting the siege. The Sanaa government said that this unilateral ceasefire could be a basis for a long-term arrangement that could launch a settlement.

The Saudi rulers have two simple choices: continue to ignore the Sanaa government and keep blaming regional powers for the war in Yemen or take the Sanaa government seriously and work with them to end the war. The former option is a path made attractive by hubris. The latter supported by facts: Yemenis are capable of building, improvising, and improving weapons that would allow them to reach any point in Saudi Arabia. The faster the Saudi rulers recognize this fact the faster they will be able to stop the bleeding in terms of both dollars and blood, literally.

Which path will the de facto ruler choose, you might ask? Historical precedents suggest that hubris is an incurable disease that strikes weak persons holding powerful positions. Short of believable threat to their power during their lifetime, those who suffer from hubris rarely overcome it; especially if such persons have managed to make themselves fully insular and isolated, unreachable with advice and good council. In the case of Saudi Arabia today however, the fact the king is still the nominal ruler, that should be a factor that could bring about an unlikely outcome.

 

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