The future of Syria in the light of similar events in SWANA

Current Events Muslims Today Reasoned Comments

by Ahmed Souaiaia

Since the start of the protest movement popularly known as the Arab Spring in 2011, all countries in Southwest Asia and North Africa (SWANA) have been impacted and the level of change in each of these countries depended on domestic, regional and global factors. However, there is one variable that established itself as a determinant one: the level and type of violence deployed to bring about change. SWANA, here, refers to countries within approximately 1000 miles of a line connecting Kabul in Afghanistan and Nouadhibou in Mauritania.

The level and type of violence deployed in each country was not a decision made by internal forces only. In fact, the pattern reflects that the more involved (external) regional and global actors were the more violent the movement would be. Consequently, at least three levels of social change manifested themselves in the region, each with significant and transformative consequences.

Level 1: Dissent

Since December 17, 2010, all countries in SWANA have experienced some form of public expression of dissent, where people in large numbers expressed their grievances in a region dominated by single family or single party rule for decades. The grievances covered many areas of concern including social, economic, cultural, religious, and political marginalization. These movements quieted down with State coercive or cosmetic intervention that met some of the demands of protesters.

Level 2: Unarmed Rebellion

In a handful of countries, protesters refused to carry out arms to resist their oppressors and they managed to bring about significant political changes, as was the case in Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, and Sudan (before the rival military factions war that started on 15 April 2023).

Level 3: Armed Rebellion

In some other countries, due to geopolitical considerations, unarmed rebellions quickly transformed into armed proxy wars whose outcome is yet to be fully assessed. The most recent of these events is what is happening in Syria.

For more than 50 years, Syria has been under both a single family and a single party rule. Historically, and geopolitically, the Baath regime in Syria allied itself with the Soviet Block and later with the Russian Federation. Domestically, the Syrian regime suffered from the same ills experienced in almost all 22-nation block of nations called the Arab League: questionable legitimacy and rampant corruption. However, the Syrian government has used populist discourse to situate itself with popular causes in the region. That, without meaningful political reform, was not enough to shield it from internal and external challenges.

After fourteen years of armed conflict, and in the context of a fast-changing world, the Syrian government could not stabilize itself and collapsed within days once the fighting resumed after four years of pause.

Since the collapse of the Syrian government took place in the context of an armed rebellion, its future might be predicted by looking at similar cases.

Generally, radical change resulting from war often leads to divided society, and in some cases, the division may result in a breakup along ethnic, religion, or ideological fault lines. From recent events within SWANA alone, it is reasonable to conclude that Syria faces a significant risk of breaking up either into totally two or more different countries or a single country with powerful regional governments. Both outcomes are not liked by regional governments, especially those in Turkey and Iraq. The evidence for the disintegration possibility can be found in Libya, Yemen, and Iraq. These three countries have experienced armed conflict since 2011. In the case of Iraq, its problems were exacerbated by the 2003 US invasion and subsequent occupation. Nonetheless, the three countries experienced regional and global interference that resulted in escalating the uprising to an armed conflict and all three countries have failed to fully recover. Libya is divided into at least three semi-autonomous regions, Yemen has two governments, and Iraq, despite the presence of a central government, is practically a two-state entity within a single nominal country and even its armed forces are fragmented with questionable control and command structures.

Similarly, Syria today, has all the ingredients for the creation of a fragmented country or a broken-down nation-state. The new leaders have months, if not weeks, to prevent the full collapse of the national order, which would give rise to a new geopolitical reality with significant implications regionally and globally.

As of this writing, rebels in northern Syrian, aided by Turkey, are in active war mode. In the south, armed groups are refusing to lay down their arms unless a credible structure that would allow them to be absorbed into the national armed forces formations is put in place. And in central Syria, ISIS remnants are rebuilding, making it possible for continued presence of armed groups.

Fast and violent processes of social change often have unintended and unpredictable outcomes. If the rebel groups, now the rulers of Syria, do not recognize this reality, assume the role of the Baath party, and ignore the subtle indicators, over time, they will face serious challenges, not totally unlike those faced by the previous regime. Only a deliberate process of reconciliation can preserve a united Syria within the current border. If a single faction, religious or otherwise, decide to monopolize power the same way the Baath party had done, Syria will likely become a failed state or a divided state, both scenarios will present new challenges to the regional and global order that exist today.


* Dr. Ahmed E. Souaiaia has taught and written about human rights for over 20 years.

Articles with byline express the opinion of its author(s) exclusively; such content does not necessarily reflect the opinion or the position of Islamic Societies Review or its editors.

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