When you isolate the noise and posturing from the facts that are governing the course of the war in Ukraine, which, at this point, is more than a special military operation given the involvement of NATO (though Russian leaders do not think that that line was crossed), two positions have been clearly stated.
The first is Russia’s position, which justified the military operation in the first place, and up to this point it has not changed: protection of ethnic Russians in Ukraine and Ukraine serving more of a buffer zone keeping the military alliance, NATO, away from the Russian border. In practical terms, this translates into granting the Donbass region autonomy and the government of Ukraine not joining NATO. When those goals were not met politically, Russia acted to impose them by force—hence the military operation. As of this writing, Russia controls more than the territories it initially sought protection for and is able to launch attacks anywhere in Ukraine.
The second position is that of current government of Ukraine and its Western backers: Ukraine is free to join any alliance it wants and all of Ukrainian territories, including Crimea which was annexed before the special military operation, must be brought back and remain under Ukrainian control.
Despite claims in the Western media and by many politicians, Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine did not isolate Russia, especially when considering countries that matter, like China, the second largest economy in the world and still rising. The visit by the Chinese president to Russia this week makes this point crystal clear. It gives credence to the national interest concerns expressed by Russia.
However, China’s understanding of Russian leaders’ justification is not motivated by logic or merit alone. It is also motivated by China’s own national interests. The West’s support to Taiwan’s interest in seceding from China is seen as interference in China’s internal affairs and a threat to its sovereignty. As such, the logic that governs its sympathy to Russia’s concerns stems from the fact that victory over Russia will limit China’s ability to protect its sovereignty and embolden what Chinese leaders see as Western hegemony. That logic is signaled by the Chinese leaders’ statements on multipolarity, while visiting Russia.
The outcome of the conflict in Ukraine must be informed by the above three positions together, not just by one position in isolation from the three or from what is happening in the rest of the world.
In such a context, it is possible to characterize the standoff as a conflict supported by two irreconcilable positions at this point: an absolutist Western position that accepts only success. Success here is defined by the president of Ukraine: the return of all territory taken by Russian including Crimea and the preservation of Ukraine’s right to joint any military alliance it wishes to join. The only way these goals can be achieved is to defeat Russia militarily. That is why this position is an absolute position. It established a clear high bar that leaves no room for negotiation.
Russia’s position seems to contain a high level of flexibility. Potentially, it could still withdraw its troops from the four regions it declared autonomous republics and agree to some form of military neutrality that could be adopted by the government of Ukraine. However, Russian leaders do not consider the status of Crimea to be up for negotiation, for them, it is Russian territory. The only way for Ukraine to reclaim Crimea, then, is to defeat Russia militarily. That is why the definition of success becomes crucial and why the definition of success is also driving Chinese choice.
By their definition of success or at least adoption of the definition of success as stated by the president of Ukraine, the West committed itself to a path that must result in the defeat of Russia. What this conflict has shown is that nation-states that are heavily armed with nuclear weapons do not lose wars–they may lose battles, but they do not lose wars.
The key to ending this conflict, then, rests with the choice the West must make: winning battles and settling for a negotiated settlement or keep working for winning the war and risk the impossible. Given this reality, it would seem that the West may have already built a safety valve that could allow them to achieve success without appearing to have lost the war or win it: personalize the conflict. That is, to make it a conflict between, not two nation-sates, but two persons: Putin and Zelenskyy. Both men are up for elections soon, and if one of them loses or made to lose, that may open new paths for settling the conflict. The same potential applies to the outcome of the presidential elections in the United States, a driving force with determinant role in setting the course of armed conflict.
