The recent developments surrounding former jihadist Ahmed al-Sharaa—formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani—and his transformation from a wanted terrorist leader into a sitting president welcomed by the President of the United States illustrate a deeply troubling fact in international relations: the arbitrary use of the “terrorism” label and economic sanctions as tools of political convenience rather than principled governance.
In 2013, al-Sharaa was designated by the United States as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” due to his leadership of the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, and his alleged role in orchestrating suicide bombings. At one point, the U.S. placed a $10 million bounty on his capture. Today, however, he shares tea and diplomatic smiles with President Donald Trump, without any transparent legal or procedural process to formally clear his name of terrorism charges. This dramatic pivot—absent any public renunciation of past actions, judicial review, or commitment to democratic norms like elections—exposes the malleability of the terrorism designation when it becomes inconvenient for geopolitical strategy.
This meeting also coincides with President Trump’s decision to lift decades-old sanctions on Syria. Justifying the move, Trump called the sanctions “brutal and crippling”—a marked reversal for a leader who has simultaneously intensified sanctions against countries like Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. These sanctions have inflicted severe economic hardship on civilian populations, often under the pretext of promoting democracy or punishing authoritarian regimes. The inconsistency here is glaring: if sanctions on Syria were cruel, how can harsher sanctions on other nations be justified on humanitarian or democratic grounds?
The political nature of both terrorism designations and sanctions becomes even clearer when one considers the strategic incentives behind Trump’s decisions. The shift in US policy on Syria appears less driven by humanitarian concern and more by alignment with Saudi Arabia’s regional interests and the broader goal of reconfiguring power balances in the Middle East post-Assad. By rebranding a former al-Qaeda affiliate as a legitimate head of state, the US has signaled that past crimes can be erased when they no longer serve its strategic narrative.
These actions undermine the credibility of the “war on terror” and cast serious doubt on the sincerity of human rights and counterterrorism agendas professed by Western powers. While terrorism remains a real and grave threat, its politicized application serves to protect allies, punish adversaries, and enable new geopolitical arrangements. This instrumentalization erodes trust in international norms, gives impunity to violent actors, and trivializes the lived realities of victims of terrorism.
Moreover, the arbitrary lifting and imposition of sanctions reveal how economic tools ostensibly designed to promote international law and protect civilians are instead leveraged to serve the interests of dominant states and powerful actors; it rewards violence and cruelty if violence and cruelty make its undertakers de facto rulers. The fact that Syria remains under authoritarian control—with no commitments to democratic transition—while receiving newfound legitimacy and investment opportunities further illustrates that sanctions are not about democracy or human rights, but about access, control, and alignment.
The developments surrounding al-Sharaa’s political rehabilitation and the selective use of sanctions exemplify the use of “terrorism” and sanctions as instruments of statecraft rather than consistent legal or ethical principles. While the threats of terrorism and authoritarianism are real, their selective treatment by global powers ensures that such threats are not eradicated, but reshaped and exploited for political gain. The consequences are dire: compromised human rights, legitimized impunity, and a global order where violence can be whitewashed if it serves strategic ends.
