by Hoda Rizk
Iran is trying to re-deepen the relationship between the Astana parties in light of the changes taking place in the region and the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on regional and international alliances, at a time when Turkey is reviewing its stances and foreign policy after a decade of failed projects, and its return as a prodigal son to follow an act of regret before it. Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, aspiring to restore the relationship with the United States after the economic and financial crisis it is going through, and trying to restore the relationship with Egypt and woo it, and return to relations that prevailed before the “Arab Spring.”
Ankara aspires to Arab, Turkish, and Israeli coordination in dealing with hot issues in the region, with its mind that Iran is the one who will pay the price for any alliance between the Americans, the Israelis, and the Arabs.
The shift in politics is not new in the behavior of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. However, between pragmatism, i.e. self-interest, and escaping forward, there is a huge difference when the politician is in a deep crisis and does not want to appear weak in front of his opponent. He does not resort to this much concessions. Rather, he works to dismantle the crisis in accordance with his interests and to enter into a win-win equation.
Iran fears the possibility of new regional alliances reversing its presence in Syria, so it is trying to protect its interests and launches the initiative to circumvent any hostile strategy, and seeks with its security, political and economic tools and means to protect its interests that have overlapped with other regional actors, in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.
Turkey was surprised by the Iranian initiative, which occurred suddenly after Abdullahian’s visit to Damascus, and the move to prevent new crises in the region after the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, which led to the normalization of relations and security coordination between Turkey and “Israel”. Moscow, the third partner, adopted the Iranian initiative, after it was accused of favoring Turkey in its project to prepare a military operation in northern Syria, which it announced would be different from its predecessors, that is, from the three operations it carried out regardless of Russia, but the changing reality today does not allow Turkey to From a Russian point of view, this “dangerous” operation was carried out. Therefore, it can be considered that the Iranian move took place with a Russian green light, after Ankara was preparing for a confrontation in Syria with Iran, Moscow and Syria, accusing Iran’s allies of coordinating with the SDF.
According to Khatibzadeh, Iran holds that a political solution is the only way to end the crisis in Syria, based on its strategic vision and principled policies, in which it used all its energy to achieve a just peace on the basis of the country’s realities.
It is not the first time that Iran is mediating between Ankara and Damascus, as former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif had previously tried to enter the mediation line between the two countries in April 2019, and then another attempt was in February 2020, with the aim of preventing further attacks. The confrontations between the two sides in the Idlib region.
But does the Turkish president realize that Iran, on its own initiative, is trying to arrange the situation in Syria in a way that guarantees its interest, because the victory of the opposition forces in Turkey – if that happens – means adopting a different policy in the Syrian file, and more openness and cooperation with Damascus. Iran is serious about saying, through the leader’s words, “Turkey’s security is from Iran’s security,” and that it “is only harboring good wishes for the region, and for our friendly and brotherly Turkey.
Erdogan, who built strategic relations with opposition Syrian forces, cannot sacrifice this alliance after nearly a decade of coordination and cooperation with them, which is the reason for his presence in northern Syria, and through it he imposed his influence. However, not accepting the Iranian offer could be a strategic mistake. Because it is in Erdogan’s Turkey’s interest to open the doors again towards Damascus for internal and external Turkish reasons, and he cannot bet on Saudi Arabia and the UAE to stand against Iran in Syria and ally with him in this regard, especially since Egypt sees Erdogan as nothing but an occupier of Arab lands and a supporter of Islamic and terrorist forces, which is taking place. Recruiting her and transferring her from Syria to Libya and Somalia, and she believes that he wants to carve out Syrian lands in order to establish an Islamic emirate, not a “Sunni,” in the face of an “Alawite” authority, as he is trying to promote.
Erdogan, who believed that he could impose his conditions on NATO, appeared frustrated after Biden promised at the G-20 summit to arm Turkey with F-16s in exchange for its agreement to enter Finland and Sweden into NATO. When he learned that the US House of Representatives passed on July 14 an amendment that would prevent the United States from selling or transferring planes to Turkey, including ensuring that they are not used in overflights of Greece, according to the Ballone Pappas Amendment Bill named after the lobby The Armenian and the Greek in the US House of Representatives, who stressed that the F-16 should not be sold to Turkey unless it guarantees Greece that its airspace will not be violated. This means asking Turkey to recognize Greek airspace, which it has not recognized for decades, meaning that Turkey must put a pledge of its sovereign rights through the US Congress. Erdogan cannot agree. The matter is not related to him personally or to his authority. Rather, it is an issue that concerns Turkey and its sovereignty.
There is no doubt that Erdogan upset Russia in Madrid by agreeing to enter Scandinavia, so CIA Director William Burns says, “NATO has recovered thanks to the Ukraine crisis, and the membership of Sweden and Finland has become stronger.” So we are coming to Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continues to threaten that if Turkey’s demand to fight terrorism, especially the PKK and its offshoots, is not met, he may not accept membership for the two Scandinavian countries that he did not prevent from applying for membership.
Does Erdogan still think that he is using his presence in NATO to achieve his ends? Will these countries really stop their dealings with the Kurdish forces? He accuses the northern countries of being supportive of terrorism, and threatens the YPG in Syria, which is sheltering the American presence supporting it on the basis of fighting ISIS. The United States can turn a blind eye to his threats, because any operation in northern Syria could lead to the destruction of the “Astana” platform and the Russian-Turkish and Iranian relations. Is this what he seeks, and in return, what gains can he obtain?
On July 19, Iran and Russia signed a cooperation agreement worth $40 billion between the two countries. On the day President Erdogan met his Russian counterpart Putin and spoke to him as a guest of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. Gazprom will assist the National Iranian Oil Company in developing new areas for the production of natural gas, which is the largest foreign investment in the Iranian economy. As for the European countries, they do not find justifications to tell their people about the decline in the economy. Will Erdogan remain the midfielder?
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* Hoda Rizk, A researcher, with focus on Turkish and Southwest Asia affairs
