According to many sources, an agreement on re-instating the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 is likely, and the terms of its provisions have begun to take shape. Here are some of the sticky points that Iran is insisting on and that are likely to be part of the agreement:
What the IRI will get:
- Lifting 1,400 ban decisions out of 1,600, with 200 remaining related to human rights and support for the resistance movements in Palestine and Lebanon under the pretext of supporting terrorism… and others.
- Lifting the ban on institutions and persons in the office of Imam Sayyed Ali Khamenei, including the Mostazafan Foundation (Mustazafan).
- Lifting the ban on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
- Lifting the ban on financial and commercial movement and everything related to the transactions of the Central Bank (Bank Melli).
- Lifting the sanctions on Iranian oil exports and Tehran’s full share (2,100,000 barrels per day).
- Lifting the ban on Iranian banks that were affected by the US sanctions, and returning the financial movement between Iran’s banks and the world to normal before the signing of the nuclear agreement in 2015.
- Lifting the ban on Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and the Iranian officials who have been subject to sanctions.
- Freeing Iranian funds frozen from oil and other revenues in a number of countries in the world due to sanctions, and sources confirm that there are between 50 and 90 billion dollars owed to Iran frozen in South Korea, China, India, Turkey, Afghanistan, and some European countries. While progress in the negotiations began to be translated into practice, South Korea announced – weeks ago – that it would release 3.5 billion out of 7 billion within days. Within the framework of demonstrating good intentions, which was requested by Tehran, the American side retracted some of its conditions and announced exemptions for foreign companies working in Iran in the non-military nuclear field.
What Iran will give up:
- Iran’s return to uranium enrichment with a purity of 3.7%, after the percentage reached 60% following the withdrawal of former US President Donald Trump from the agreement in 2018.
- Putting restrictions on the activity of the Fordow nuclear facility fortified in a mountain in Qom province, a facility that contains 166 centrifuges of the sixth generation AR-6 according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which also reported that Iran is using it to enrich uranium to 20%.
- Stopping the operation of the sixth generation centrifuges, and reducing the number of centrifuges of other generations.
Regarding the problematic law issued by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, which provides for suspending the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, known as the NPT, and provides for allowing the IAEA and international observers to continue to inspect and monitor the course of the nuclear program, the Iranian side appear to indicate that the Shura Council’s decision came as a response to a long withdrawal. The United States has withdrawn from the agreement, and in the event of a return to it, this decision will no longer be legally binding on the Iranian government, because the purpose and goal it was set for is no longer required.
Self-Guarantees: Uranium will not leave the country
In 2015, it was agreed between Iran and the countries party to the nuclear agreement, to put the amount of Iranian enriched uranium to a third party, and it was indeed transferred to a European country until the US pulled out of the agreement. Recently, Tehran announced that it has 25 kilograms of enriched uranium. During the negotiation period, some suggested that Russia hold the quantity Iran possesses, but Tehran refused to do so. Iran informed the concerned parties that keeping this quantity under the supervision and control of international inspectors would be one of Iran’s “self-assurances”, especially after the Biden administration refused to provide guarantees with Congressional approval of the agreement so that the scenario of 2018 and Trump’s unilateral exit from the agreement would not be repeated.
Among the “self-assurances” also, Iran made it clear during the negotiations that, with the United States unable to provide actual guarantees, as confirmed by its President Joe Biden, it would resort, as soon as Washington withdrew from the agreement, to activate the eighth generation centrifuges AR-8 and raise the level of enrichment by 60%. Iran could reach 90% with Iran’s current ability.
The Boeing aircraft deal is unresolved
During the previous agreement, Washington expressed its displeasure that all commercial deals and investment contracts were for the European countries without it directly benefiting commercially from the agreement, and accordingly US sought to conclude a deal that would also benefit Iran in light of the latter’s need to modernize its air fleet to transport passengers that had reached its age to forty years. During the reign of former reformist President Hassan Rouhani, there was talk of a deal under which Tehran would buy 100 American Boeing planes to be delivered over 10 years, an average of 10 planes annually, at a value of about $20 billion, but the deal did not take place.
Now, Washington returns to presenting this deal as a kind of mutual benefit, as well as a kind of guarantees and goodwill. While Tehran has not yet announced its desire to complete this or not, and if this deal actually takes place, it will be the first commercial deal between the two sides since the diplomatic rupture in 1979.
Direct negotiations between Tehran and Washington: practical steps first
Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi’s announcement of Iran’s consent to hold direct negotiations with the American side represented a clear shift in the course of the talks, after Washington’s repeated demands since the first day to join the direct talks. But what is not reported by the media and what constitutes confusion among world public opinion is the following:
Iran agreed to hold direct negotiations at the last minute, within the framework of 1 + 5 and not bilateral negotiations, that is, hosting the American negotiator in one hall in the Coburg Hotel, after the Iranian side insisted on staying in a nearby hotel throughout the last period, in a move that Iran wanted to clarify to public opinion. Washington is the one who withdrew from the nuclear agreement, and therefore it is negotiating with the remaining states parties to the agreement, i.e. 1 + 4, and Washington is not legally entitled to join the talks directly because it left the agreement in the first place. And Tehran is now ready for that, but with conditions, the first of which is to complete the last step, and if it senses a serious commitment to practical steps on the American side to lift the siege and return to the agreement.
It should be noted that the nuclear agreement signed in 2015 was the American side sitting at the direct negotiating table like any other party from the 5+1 countries.
