Speculation increased about the summit that took place between the Turkish and Russian presidents in Sochi about what the two leaders had agreed upon, especially since the summit took place behind closed doors and did not include the presence of any additional officials from the two parties, although Turkish intelligence chief Hakan Fidan was among the delegation accompanying President Erdogan, but what is certain is that Syria, and in particular Idlib, was at the negotiating table between the two sides.
For context, it should be noted that the summit of Presidents Putin-Assad that took place recently and preceded the Putin-Erdogan summit. During this earlier summit, Putin firmly and explicitly affirmed Russia’s and Syria’s discontent with the situation in Idlib and the need for foreign forces (in reference to the US and Turkish forces) to leave Syria. Putin’s direct reference to this matter is noteworthy. He stated then that the presence of foreign troops in Syria with the government’s permission “stands as an obstacle in front of the success of the Syrian state in managing the country’s economy.”
Five other events should be recalled to better contextualize Putin-Erdogan summit.
One: The Russian establishment’s statements prior to the Putin-Erdogan summit, when the Russian presidential spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, stressed that the continued terrorist presence in the Idlib region and northwest Syria is “dangerous and unacceptable” and affects progress for a political solution in the country reveals Russia’s strategy. In addition to the escalation of the Russian joint air strikes with the Syrian government against the armed groups in Idlib, which is evidence that the meeting between Putin and Erdogan included a Turkish request to ease these strikes; in return, Russia is likely to request the implementation of the Sochi 2018 agreements on the Aleppo-Latakia International Road.
Two: Most observers predict an American exit from Syria. Press leaks about a possible consensus between the Syrian state and the Kurds discussions about self-administration in the areas controlled by the SDF support the possibility that this scenario is likely to happen sooner than many think. Turkey must be eager to obtain agreements with the Syrian state, with Russian mediation, on this issue before it is too late.
Three: The news leaked by the Turkish press about Turkish intelligence chief Fidan Hakan’s request to meet President Assad and the latter’s refusal, and the meeting that might take place between Hakan and his Syrian counterpart “Ali Mamlouk” in Jordan, which, if proven true, confirms Ankara’s concerns about a possible US withdrawal and possible Kurdish reconciliation the Syrian government as well.
Four: Turkey recently changed the map of alliances and went as far as closing the offices of the Muslim Brotherhood in the country to restore relations with the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and attempt to rebuild relations with Egypt.
Five: many observers speculate that President Assad could agree to meet with President Erdogan only after a complete Turkish withdrawal from Idlib and northern Syria. Such an event would require a plan that force the armed groups in Idlib to give up their heavy and light weapons, evacuate Idlib from terrorist groups, and the adoption of national reconciliation measures. Turkey abandoning its support to armed groups in Idlib and northern Syria is just one step of many in the direction of a broad, lasting solution to the crisis in Syria.
The contours of any agreement between Putin and Erdogan in relations to Syria will reveal itself gradually, starting with events that will start to unfold in Idlib. If Turkey takes serious steps to reopen the Aleppo-Lattakia highway, stop the militants’ attacks on the areas controlled by the Syrian government, then, it would signal that Erdogan agreed to force the groups under his influence to engage in a political process instead of continuing the armed struggle. If the Syrian government and the Russian air force escalate in Idlib, it would signal that the Russians have concluded that Erdogan is unable or unwilling to take actions against the presence of armed groups in the northwest of Syria. In all cases, the fragmentation of Syrian territory is not sustainable, not just from the point of view of the Syrian government, but from an informed self-interested position on the side of Turkey long term. The game is now how to make this a soft-landing for everyone, if that is at all possible.
